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ARTICLE

Sande L Buhai
Everyone Makes Mistakes:
Attorney's Fee Recovery in Legal Malpractice Suits
Abstract. This Article argues that the American Rule should be changed
for legal malpractice suits because the attorney-client relationship is the
quintessential fiduciary relationship and because of the added concern of
unequal information available to each party as a result of the large disparity in
power. Attorneys must abide by ethical rules and owe fiduciary duties to their
clients, which include the duties of competence, diligence, and loyalty.
Because it is this very relationship that distinguishes legal malpractice suits
from an ordinary lawsuit, awarding attorney's fees to the damaged plaintiff
client helps maintain fiduciary relationships and furthers the interests of
justice.
This Article first explains the law of legal malpractice and fiduciary duty.
Then, the Article examines the American Rule on attorney's fees and the
current exceptions, including contractual agreements, the common fund
doctrine, the private attorney general doctrine, federal and statutory
exceptions, and the bad faith doctrine. Finally, the Article looks at the
treatment of legal malpractice cases and awards of attorney's fees in the fifty
states and sets forth the argument that legal malpractice cases should be an
additional exception to the American Rule.
Lawyers should accept
responsibility for their mistakes and do what is required to make their clients
whole.
Author. Clinical Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The
author would like to thank Loyola Law School for its continuing support of
faculty scholarship for all faculty members. She would also like to thank her
children, Samantha and Genevieve, for forcing her to teach them about
accepting responsibility.
32

ARTICLE CONTENTS

I. Introduction
..............................
II. Legal Malpractice and Breach of Fiduciary Duty .....
A. Legal Malpractice.
........................
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty..................
III. History and General Discussion of the
American Rule
.............................
IV. Exceptions to the American Rule...............
A. Contractual Agreements...................
B. Common Fund Doctrine
..................
C. Private Attorney General Doctrine ...........
D. Civil Rights Statutes
......................
E. Unilateral Fee-Shifting ....................
F. Reciprocal Fee-Shifting .............
......
G. The Dual Fee-Shifting Standard................
H. Bad Faith Exception......................
1. History of the Bad Faith Doctrine ..........
2. Categories of Bad Faith Exception...........
3. Purpose for and Problems with the
Exception ...........................
V. Current State Treatment of Attorney's Fees in
......................
Legal Malpractice Cases
VI. Legal Malpractice Suits Should Be an
Additional Exception to the American Rule in
All Jurisdictions
............................
...............................
VII. Conclusion

33

34
35
37
41
48
51
52
53
53
54
55
56
58
61
61
63
63
67
72
74

34

ST. MARY's JouRNAL oN LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHiCS

I.

[Vol. 6:32

INTRODUCTION

Have you heard the joke about the lawyer who ... ? Of course you
have. Lawyer jokes are pervasive because lawyers are perceived badly by
many in our society, and many of these jokes are about how lawyers
interact with their clients.' Although changing the rules about how legal
malpractice cases are handled will not necessarily change the perception of
lawyers in our society, it is nevertheless time that lawyers be held
responsible for their misconduct by making sure their clients are made
completely whole when lawyers have been negligent. Your parents and
other mentors probably told you that if you make a mistake you need to
accept responsibility for it, say you are sorry, and then do your best to fix
it.2 The same concept should apply to lawyers.
Under the American Rule, each side must pay its own attorney's fees,
win or lose.' For example, if someone negligently runs into your car but
refuses to pay for the damages, you have to hire a lawyer and sue them to
recover the damages. Although you prevail and recover an amount
sufficient to cover the cost of having your car fixed, you are still out
money because you have to pay your lawyer about one-third of the
recovery. A legal malpractice suit, however, adds insult to injury because
plaintiffs then incur more damages from having to retain another attorney
to rectify the consequences of the previous attorney's mistake.' Unlike
breach of contract or personal injury cases, legal malpractice suits are
distinguishable from other lawsuits because of the special fiduciary nature
of the attorney-client relationship.
1. See Albert Nerenberg, Can We Humanie Lanyers, or Are the Jokes Too Funny, HUFFINGTON
POST CANADA: THE BLOG (Feb. 22, 2013, 10:09 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/albertnerenberg/can-lawyer-jokes-be-defie b_2727358.htmI (reviewing the reasons for the numerous jokes
about lawyers).
2. See Bruce Lee, BRAINYQUOTE.COM, http://brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/b/brucelee
383809.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) ("Mistakes are always forgivable, if one has the courage to
admit them."); John C Maxwell, BRAINYQUOTE.COM, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/
quotes/j/johncmaxw391398.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) ("A man must be big enough to admit his
mistakes, smart enough to profit from them, and strong enough to correct them."); Dale Tumer,
BRAINYQuoTE.COM, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/d/daleturnerl21034.htmi
(last
visited Jan. 7, 2016) ("It is the highest form of self-respect to admit our errors and mistakes and make
amends for them. To make a mistake is only an error in judgment, but to adhere to it when it is
discovered shows infirmity of character.").
3. See, e.g., Trope v. Katz, 902 P.2d 259, 262 (Cal. 1995) (citing Gray v. Don Miller & Assocs.,
674 P.2d 253, 257 (Cal. 1984) (explaining the American Rule, which requires both parties to pay their
own attorney's fees)).
4. See, e.g., Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 958 P.2d 1062, 1.078 (Cal.
1998) ("Jordache expended attorney fees as a direct result of its attorney's alleged negligence well
before the resolution of any collateral judicial action.").
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This Article argues that the American Rule should be changed for legal
malpractice suits because the attorney-client relationship is the
quintessential fiduciary relationship and because of the added concern of
unequal information available to each party as a result of the large disparity
in power. Attorneys must abide by ethical rules and owe fiduciary duties
to their clients, which include the duties of competence, diligence, and
loyalty.s Because it is this very relationship that distinguishes legal
malpractice suits from an ordinary lawsuit, awarding attorney's fees to the
damaged plaintiff-client helps maintain fiduciary relationships and furthers
the interests of justice.
This Article first explains, in Part II, the law of legal malpractice and
fiduciary duty. Part III explains the history behind the American Rule and
further examines its support, including the encouragement for litigants to
prosecute or defend a lawsuit, the burden on courts and parties to
determine what reasonable attorney's fees are, and the goal to preserve
independent advocacy. Part III then provides the basic arguments against
the American Rule, including the encouragement for litigants to entertain
frivolous suits and the consequent prevention of litigants from defending
meritorious claims, and, finally, the denial of full recovery to successful
plaintiffs.
Part IV discusses the current exceptions to the American Rule,
including contractual agreements, the common fund doctrine, the private
attorney general doctrine, federal and statutory exceptions, and the bad
faith doctrine. In discussing the bad faith doctrine, Part IV details its
history, its different categories, its goals and problems, and the applicable
ethical rules and fiduciary relationships.
Part V looks at the treatment of legal malpractice cases and awards of
attorney's fees in the fifty states. Part VI then sets forth the argument that
legal malpractice cases should be an additional exception to the American
Rule. Part VII concludes the Article.
II.

LEGAL MALPRACTICE

AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY

DUTY

A lawyer's actions can constitute attorney malpractice or breach of
fiduciary duty in many different ways. Some actions can be criminal, such
as stealing client funds;' others can be simple mistakes, like missing an
5. Sande Buhai, Lanyers as Fiduiauies, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 554-55 (2009); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) (requiring lawyers to "provide competent
representation to [their clients]"); id. r. 1.3 ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client").
6. See Palomo v. State Bar of Cal., 685 P.2d 1185, 1191-92 (Cal. 1984) (finding grounds for
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important deadline.' Other common issues entail either representing
clients with some sort of conflict of interest or some other law-practice
management issue.'
Legal malpractice cases are different from other causes of action
because of the special nature of the attorney-client relationship.9 An
attorney owes fiduciary duties to his clients, including "the duty to exercise
in all his relationships with this client-principal the most scrupulous
honor, good faith and fidelity to his client's interest."' 0 Consequently,
when a lawyer is sued for legal malpractice, he is often sued for breach of
fiduciary duty as well."
Because legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary are both tort causes of
action, they require proof of similar elements.' 2 However, a breach of
fiduciary duty is not per se legal malpractice because the elements of each
cause of action are different in fact-a distinction further explored in the
discussion below." Nevertheless, they are often concurrently alleged
because a breach of a fiduciary duty can also constitute legal malpractice.' 4
For example, in many cases, failure to segregate a client's funds, as
required by state ethical rules, constitutes both legal malpractice and
willful misappropriation and comingling of funds constituting gross negligence where an attorney
allegedly endorsed a client's check without permission and deposited the check into the firm's payroll
account instead of the client's trust).
7. See Adams v. Paul, 904 P.2d 1205, 1215 (Cal. 1995) (explaining an attorney may be found
liable for legal malpractice based upon failure to file a lawsuit prior to the expiration of the applicable
statute of limitations).
8. See, e.g., Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 779 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding an attorney
breached her duty of loyalty to the client where the attorney failed to disclose her plans to join the
legal practice of opposing counsel).
9. See Michael C. Moore, Note, Legal Maoracticeand the Bad Faith Exception to the American Rule: A
SuggestedApprvachfor Addressing IntentionalLanyer Misconduct, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1141, 1164 (1991)
("The justification for treating legal malpractice cases stemming from ethical violations differently
from other types of tortious conduct comes largely from the unique nature of the lawyer--client
relationship.").
10. Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12,16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
11. See, e.g., Stanley, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 769 (considering an appeal from nonsuit judgment in
case involving claims of malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty).
12. The elements of legal malpractice include:
(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of
his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal
connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage
resulting from the professional's negligence.
Jackson v. Johnson, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 482, 484-85 (Ct. App. 1995).
13. See Stanley, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 776 (distinguishing breach of fiduciary duty from professional
negligence).
14. See, e.g., id. at 783 (finding evidence supporting action for both legal malpractice and breach
of fiduciary duty based on the same alleged misconduct).
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breach of a fiduciary duty. 1 5
A.

LegalMapractice

An attorney is liable for legal malpractice if she is negligent in the
performance of her professional duties.' 6 This cause of action requires a
plaintiff to show: (1) a legal duty of care; (2) breach of that duty; (3)
causation; and (4) harm.1 Whether an attorney has a duty to a client is a
question of law; whether the attorney has breached this duty is a question
of fact. 18
An attorney owes a client the duty to use the skill, prudence, and
diligence that lawyers of ordinary capacity commonly possess." This
requires an attorney to "possess knowledge of those plain and elementary
principles of law which are commonly known by well[-]informed
attorneys, and to discover those additional rules of law which, although
not commonly known, may readily be found by standard research
techniques." 2 0 This duty to act competently is required by Model Rule
1.121 and California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-110.22
An attorney's duty to act competently requires the attorney to perform
reasonable research into relevant legal principles to make an informed
decision about various aspects of the representation." If an attorney is a

15. T & R Foods, Inc. v. Rose, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 41, 45 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1996).
16. See Jackson, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 484-85 (defining duty in legal malpractice cases as "the duty
of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession
commonly possess and exercise").
17. See id. (listing the elements of a cause of action for legal malpractice).

18. Ishmael v. Millington, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595 (Ct. App. 1966). Although many of the cases
cited are from California, they reflect the majority view of the many states. See generally RONALD E.
MALLEN WITH ALLISON MARTIN RHODES, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (2015 ed.) (providing an
extensive treatise on legal malpractice in the United States).

19. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961) (detailing the high level of skill and
capacity lawyers impliedly agree to employ by accepting employment in the legal profession).

20. Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (Cal. 1975).
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) (explaining the
requirement for attorneys to be competent when representing clients).
22. As of 2011, forty-six jurisdictions have adopted a revision of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct; California and Texas have not. Status of State Reeiew of ProfessionalConduct Rules,
A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/
ethics_2000_statuschart.authcheckdam.pdf (last updated Sept. 14, 2011); see also CAL. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3-110 (2004) (defining competence as required from an attorney acting in a
professional capacity).

23. See Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 780 (Ct. App. 1995) ("When rendering
advice to a client, 'an attorney assumes an obligation to his client to undertake reasonable research in
an effort to ascertain relevant legal principles and to make an informed decision as to a course of
conduct based upon an intelligent assessment of the problem."' (quoting Smith, 530 P.2d at 595)).
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specialist, he must exercise the standard of care of other specialists in the
same field." Expert testimony is the preferred method of establishing
whether the requisite legal standard of care has been met in a case.2 5
Generally, an attorney will only be liable for legal malpractice to clients
retained in a contractual attorney-client relationship.2 ' An exception to
the attorney-client relationship requirement may apply if an attorney
breaches a duty owed to a successor in interest of a client who was
originally in privity of contract with the attorney.27 This situation usually
arises in the trust or estate context, where an attorney may owe a duty to
intended beneficiaries of legal services, even if those beneficiaries are not
in privity of contract with the attorney.2 8 For example, courts have noted
that an attorney may owe a duty of care to foreseeable beneficiaries of a
will.2 9
An attorney is not liable for every mistake made, but only for those that
are so deficient as to violate the average standard of care in the legal
profession.3 0 For example, one court held that a remote, minor error
made when interpreting an unsettled and confusing area of the law-the
rule against perpetuities-was not a sufficient breach of an attorney's
standard of care.
A violation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct or any state
version of those rules does not constitute a per se breach of an attorney's
duty but may be evidence of legal malpractice. 3 2 Expert testimony is also
24. See Neel v. Magana, 491 P.2d 421, 428 (Cal. 1971) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 299A cmt. d (1965) (applying a heightened level of skill to attorneys who specialize within
the profession)).
25. Lysick v. Walcom, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 419 (Ct. App. 1968).
26. See Borissoff v. Taylor & Faust, 93 P.3d 337, 340 (Cal. 2004) (generalizing the concept that
attorneys will only be liable for malpractice to parties with whom they have contracted).
27. See id. at 340 (extrapolating from the probate code to explain instances when a successor-ininterest may have standing to sue an attorney for breach of fiduciary duty).
28. See id. (holding "a successor fiduciary does have standing to sue an attorney retained by a
predecessor fiduciary to give tax advice for the benefit of the estate").

29. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961) (allowing intended beneficiaries of a will
to recover where the attorney failed to fulfill his obligations to the testator). But see Barcelo v. Elliott,

923 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex. 1996) (barring estate-planning legal malpractice claims brought by thirdparty beneficiaries).

30. See Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 593 (Cal. 1975) (describing the appropriate standard for
determining whether an attorney should be held accountable for the quality of legal advice given).
31. See Lucas, 364 P.2d at 689-90 (holding the attorney did not breach the standard of care in
drafting a will, which may have violated the rule against perpetuities, highlighting the complicated
state of the rule).

32. See Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271 (Ct. App. 1973) (differentiating
disciplinary action available for breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct from liability in
damages).
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used to show whether an attorney's actions conformed to the applicable
legal standard.1 3 However, expert testimony is not required where an
attorney's actions constitute readily apparent, "numerous, blatant[,] and
egregious violations of ... professional standards." 3 4
The legal
malpractice plaintiff must prove a proximate causal connection between an
attorney's conduct and the client's actual injury.3 ' To do this, the plaintiff
can show that but for the alleged negligence, the plaintiff would have
obtained a more favorable judgment or settlement or that the alleged
negligence was a concurrent independent cause of the harm.
In litigation, criminal, and transactional contexts, the plaintiff is required
to prove "that butfor the alleged malpractice, it is more likely than not that
the plaintiff would have obtained a more favorable result." 3 As such, the
plaintiff must prove a "case-within-a-case," by showing that, had the
attorney not been negligent, the outcome of litigation or settlement would
have been more favorable to the plaintiff." Therefore, even in a
transactional context, the plaintiff must also show what would have
happened but for the negligence." Causation does not need to be proven
with absolute certainty; instead, the plaintiff can establish causation by
showing enough evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that the
attorney's actions were more likely than not the cause in fact of the
resulting harm.4 0
The plaintiff must show "that the loss suffered was in fact caused by the
33. See Lysick v. Walcom, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 419 (Ct. App. 1968) ("Expert evidence in a
malpractice suit is conclusive as to the proof of the prevailing standard of skill and learning in
the locality ... and of the propriety of a particular conduct by the practitioner in particular
instances because such standard and skill is not a matter of general knowledge and can only be
supplied by expert testimony.").

34. Day v. Rosenthal, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89, 102-03 (Ct. App. 1985).
35. See e.g., Lysick, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 417 ("The question remains whether defendant's breach of
duty was a proximate cause of damage to the estate, that is, whether there was causation in fact upon
which loss to the estate could be predicated." (citing Ishmael v. Millington, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595 (Ct.

App. 1966))).
36. See Viner v. Sweet, 70 P.3d 1046, 1051 (Cal. 2003) (refusing to distinguish the causation
element in legal malpractice cases from the well-established standard already used in negligence
cases).

37. Id. at 1054.
38. See Ambriz v. Kelegian, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 2007) (evaluating the underlying
premises liability action in a legal malpractice action as the "case within a case").
39. See Viner, 70 P.3d at 1052 ("The 'but for' test of causation applies to a claim of legal
malpractice in the settlement of litigation, even though the settlement is itself a form of business

transaction." (citing Marshak v. Ballesteros, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 3-4 (Ct. App. 1999))).
40. See id. at 1053 (clarifying the burden of proof necessary to establish "but for" causation to
be only such evidence as required to provide a reasonable basis to conclude that a defendant's action
was more likely than not the cause of the harm).
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alleged attorney malpractice."'
The loss suffered cannot have been
remotely or speculatively caused by the attorney's negligence, and the
court will "deny recovery where the unfavorable outcome was likely to
occur anyway, the client already knew the problems with the deal, or where
the client's own misconduct or misjudgment caused the problems." 4 2
When the harm may be attributed to multiple independent causes-one of
which being attorney negligence-courts will seek to determine whether
the attorney's negligence was "a substantial factor in bringing about [the]
harm." 4 The causation element will be satisfied if the attorney's conduct,
which alone would be sufficient to cause the injury, was a substantial
factor in causing the injury.4 4
A plaintiff must show actual injury sustained as a result of an attorney's
negligence, which is a question of fact." Legal negligence that causes
"only nominal damages, speculative harm, or the threat of future harm" is
not actionable.4" Proving actual injury does not depend on a prior
adjudication, judgment, or settlement." Rather, "[t]o establish this harm
or damage, the client must prove that careful management of the
underlying action would have resulted in a favorable judgment and the
collection thereof, or, if the client were defending, that the proper handling
of the case would have resulted in a defense verdict."4
Although a
showing of a quantifiable monetary sum is favorable, it is not required
because actual injury may also consist of the loss of a right or remedy, such
as a loss of the right to sue due to the tolling of the statute of limitations.4 9
A client may also suffer actionable injury on the entry of adverse judgment

41. See id. at 1052 (quoting John H. Bauman, Damagesfor Legal Maoracice: An Appraisalof the

Crumbling Dike and the Threatening Flood, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1127, 1154-55 (1988) (referring to the
showing of loss suffered having been caused by attorney malpractice as the first hurdle for a client
claiming malpractice)).

42. Id.
43. See id. at 1051 ("[If 'two forces are actively operating... and each of itself is sufficient to
bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in
bringing it about." (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965))).

44. Id.; see also Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 876 (Cal. 1991) (explaining when negligence
actions involve independent but concurrent causes and the defendant's conduct is found to be a
substantial factor in causing the harm, the defendant is liable for his negligence, notwithstanding the
fact "that identical harm would have occurred without it").

45.
46.
47.
48.

Adams v. Paul, 904 P.2d 1205, 1212 (Cal. 1995).
Id. at 1209.
Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, 958 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Cal. 1995).
Laird v. Blacker, 828 P.2d 691, 696 (Cal. 1992).

49. See Jordache Enters., Inc., 958 P.2d at 1070 (rejecting the assertion that damages must be
attributed to a quantifiable sum of money to constitute appreciable actual injury, clarifying that loss
of a remedy, or right, or impairment, or diminution may also be actual injury).
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or on a dismissal order.so Generally, in a legal malpractice action, the
measure of damages is limited to the value of the claim lost and those
damages directly and proximately caused by the attorney's negligence."
B.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

An attorney's duty to a client is not limited to the requirement that he
exercise a professional standard of care; rather, an attorney also owes an
ethical duty to satisfy "a wider obligation to exercise due care to protect a
client's interests in all ethical ways and in all circumstances . . . conclusively

established by the Rules of Professional Conduct." 5 2 Courts will often
refer to the state rules of professional conduct in defining the scope of the
attorney's fiduciary duty." Accordingly, certain attorney misconduct can
constitute a breach of a fiduciary duty and legal malpractice." However,
"breach of a fiduciary duty is a species of tort distinct from a cause of
action for professional negligence."" While the main duty implicated in a
legal malpractice action is the duty to act competently, various decisions
have stated that as fiduciaries, attorneys owe clients enhanced duties of
loyalty and confidence.5 6
Because ethical rules highlight the special nature of the attorney-client
relationship, clients have an absolute right to enjoy the rights that are
reflected in the ethical rules and are inherent in the attorney-client
relationship." The American Bar Association (ABA) created a set of
ethical rules that outline a standard of legal ethics and professional
responsibility for lawyers in the United States: the ABA Model Rules of

50. See Laird, 828 P.2d at 696 (rejecting attorney's argument that reversal of an adverse
judgment negates a possible legal malpractice action).

51. See Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Berenstein, LLP, 69 P.3d 965, 969, 973 (Cal.
2003) (citing Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (Cal. 1975) (identifying liability of attorneys in
negligence as being for direct and proximately caused damages, and reviewing the policy reasons for
rejecting a claim for punitive damages awards in a negligence claim)).

52. Day v. Rosenthal, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89, 102 (Ct. App. 1985).

"The standards governing an

attorney's ethical duties are conclusively established by the Rules of Professional Conduct." Id.

53. Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 776 (Ct. App. 1995).
54. See T & R Foods, Inc. v. Rose, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 41, 45 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1996) (finding
legal malpractice actionable when an attorney breaches the duties of good faith and fidelity owed to a
client).
55. Stanley, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 776-77. To prevail in an action for breach of fiduciary duty, a
plaintiff must prove: (1) a fiduciary duty exists; (2) breach of a fiduciary duty; (3) causation; and (4)
damages. Id. at 776.
56. See, e.g., id. at 778 (reiterating an attorney's long-standing duty of loyalty to clients to include
a keeping a client's confidences, even to the attorney's own peril).

57. See Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407, 410 (Minn. 1982) (stating obligations incumbent on an
attorney because of the fiduciary duty owed to a client).
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Professional Conduct (Model Rules).ss
To create a fiduciary relationship, an attorney must knowingly enter into
an attorney-client relationship, and the fiduciary duty will not extend to
anyone outside of this relationship." Entering into the attorney-client
relationship automatically implicates the attorney's duty of loyalty.6 0 For
example, an attorney does not owe a duty of care to prospective clients
that are not retained because the duty of loyalty attaches only to clients in
the attorney-client relationship.6 1 Therefore, while, in limited situations,
an attorney can be liable to persons outside the attorney-client
relationship, an attorney cannot otherwise be liable to third parties for a
breach of a fiduciary duty.6 2 Nevertheless, fiduciary duties can extend to
protect former clients, such as in conflict of interest situations.
The scope of an attorney's duty to a present or former client is
determined as a matter of law. 6' The basic fiduciary duties involve loyalty
and confidentiality.6 5 "Although the phrasing.., is varied and often
dependent upon the context of particular circumstances," these duties
"exist in every jurisdiction in the United States," 6 6 and "include acting
58. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) (establishing
guidelines for attorney ethical standards which individual states have subsequently used and adopted
from to establish local ethical guidelines). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct replaced the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1983. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS,
RULES & STATUTES 1 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., 2014-15 ed. 2015) (tracing the history of standards,
codes, and rules promulgated by the ABA since 1908).

59. See Pierce v. Lyman, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236, 241 (Ct. App. 1991) (explaining an attorney-client
relationship may not typically be created by implication).

60. See Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 960 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting) (asserting
the duty of care attaches when the attorney agrees to represent the client).
61. See id. at 959-60 (holding an attorney has no duty to advise a potential client to seek
alternate representation if doing so would violate the duty of loyalty owed to a current client). There
are, however, some ethical duties that attach to potential clients, namely the duties of confidentiality
and competence. See MODEL RULES r. 1.18 (providing "[e]ven when no client-lawyer relationship
ensues, a lawyer who has learned information from a prospective client shall not use or reveal that
information," except as permitted by the rules); id. r. 1.18 cmt. 9 (suggesting a duty of competence is
owed to a prospective client who receives "assistance on the merits of a matter").

62. See Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd. v. Silldorf, Burdman, Duignan & Eisenberg, 265 Cal. Rptr.
330, 335 (Ct. App. 1990) (providing an attorney's fiduciary duties may extend "to conduct not strictly
pertaining to representation of a client, and to conduct with a nonclient which affects the relationship
with a client").
63. See, e.g., id. at 335-36 ("[Al breach can arise when an attorney gains an unfair advantage over
a former client by using confidential information acquired from the relationship.").

64. Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 776 (Ct. App. 1995). Further, whether a duty
exists is also a question of law. David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339, 341 (Ct.

App. 1988).
65. Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduday Duty, Tort and Contract:A Primeron

the Legal Ma racicePule, 47 SMU L. REV. 235, 240 (1994).
66. Id. at 240-41 (quoting RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
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with utmost fairness to clients, making full disclosure, avoiding conflicts of
interest, and preserving confidences of the client." 6 ' The duties of loyalty
and confidentiality are higher with the attorney-client relationship than
other relationships from which causes of action begin.6'
That is, an
attorney involved in a legal malpractice case because of an ethical rule
violation is different from "a person who breaches a contract or runs
someone down with an automobile" for the reason that society expects a
higher standard of care from attorneys than from laypeople. 6 9
An attorney's duty of loyalty is most often implicated in matters
regarding conflicts of interest and prohibits attorneys from taking a
position inconsistent with the interests of present or former clients. 70 In
the civil context, an attorney's duty of loyalty is most often implicated in
conflicts of interest pertaining to the representation of either former or
present clients."
In criminal cases, the duty is implicated in the
representation of co-defendants." Model Rule 1.7 delineates the standard
pertaining to representation involving conflicts of interest:
[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1)
the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients
will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 7 3
A preexisting attorney-client relationship requires an attorney to obtain
informed consent of the former client before undertaking future adverse
representation, and an attorney will be liable to the former client for
breach of fiduciary duty if he does not do so. 4 However, proper written

( 11.1, at 631 (3d ed. 1989)).
67. Id. at 241.
68. See Moore, supra note 9, at 1166 (analyzing the different duties that arise from an attorneyclient relationship versus from a breach of contract).

69. Id.
70. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 685, 699
(Ct. App. 2002) (finding a conflict of interest exists if the attorney has an interest adverse to that
necessary to represent a current or former client).
71. See id. at 698 (affirming trial court judgment in favor of client where jury found the attomey
breached his duty of loyalty by violating state ethical rule prohibiting representation of clients with
conflicting interests).
72. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASs'N 2013) (explaining when a
concurrent conflict of interest arises as between co-defendants in a criminal case).

73. Id.
74. See David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339, 343 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoting
the trial court, which held that the defendants breached fiduciary duty to plaintiff when defendants
"knowingly acquired a pecuniary interest adverse to [the] plaintiff without first obtaining plaintiff's
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consent from a client informed of a potential conflict will insulate an
attorney from violating the duty of loyalty. 75

There are some conflicts

that cannot be waived because they are so harmful that no reasonable
lawyer would ask their client to sign such a waiver. 7 6
A fiduciary relationship involves confidentiality, which arises when a
client places trust and confidence in the integrity and fidelity of the
attorney.7 7 California Business and Professions Code Section 6068(e)(1)
defines an attorney's duty to "maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets[] of his or her
client." 7 ' The duty of confidentiality is premised on the trust and
confidences in an attorney that a client has because of the protections of
the attorney-client privilege. 7 ' The duty is a fiduciary one "because the
person in whom trust and confidence is reposed and who accepts that
trust and confidence is in a superior position to exert unique influence
over the dependent party."8o
The fiduciary duty of confidentiality does not necessarily end when the
attorney-client relationship terminates because an attorney is prohibited
from using confidential information obtained in the course of the
relationship in the future.8" A breach of a fiduciary duty often arises when
informed written consent").

75. See Lysick v. Walcom, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 413-14 (Ct. App. 1968) ("[A]n attorney may
usually, under minimum standards of professional ethics, represent dual interests as long as full
consent and full disclosure occur."); see also MODEL RULES r. 1.7(b) (requiring the client's written
informed consent).
76. MODEL RULES r. 1.7 cmt. 14; see also id. r. 1.7 cmt. 15 ("[Rlepresentation is prohibited if[,]
in the circumstancesL] the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation."); id. r. 1.7 cmt. 16 (describing some conflicts are rendered
non-consentable when statute or decisional law prohibits such representation); id. r. 1.7 cmt. 17
("[C]onflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous development of
each client's position when the clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation or
other proceeding.").

77. See Wolf v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 860, 863 (Ct. App. 2003) (explaining a
fiduciary relationship is essentially a confidential relation in which one person places trust or
confidence in another person's integrity and fidelity). Model Rule 1.6 states: "A lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent,
the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is
permitted...." MODEL RULES r. 1.6. California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-100 states: "A
member shall not reveal information protected from disclosure ... without the informed consent of
the client...." CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3-100 (2004).

78. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)(1) (West 2015).
79. See Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasizing the
relationship between an attorney and client is one of the highest character).
80. Id.

81. See Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey, 15 P.2d 505, 508 (Cal. 1932) ("The relation of attorney
and client is one of highest confidence, and, as to professional information gained while this relation
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an attorney undertakes representation of a client with interests adverse to
those of current or former clients. 8 2 In one case, while taking this
position was insufficient to constitute "traditional professional
negligence," it still constituted a breach of the attorney's fiduciary duty to
his clients, as outlined in the Rules of Professional Conduct." An
attorney does not need to actually disclose a prior client's confidences;
rather, it is the conduct of putting himself in a position of being able to do
so that breaches the fiduciary duty.8 4
Sometimes discussed as a duty to disclose, an attorney has a duty to
provide full written disclosures to clients because of the nature of the trust
and confidence clients have in their attorneys.8 5 For example, not only do
attorneys have to represent their clients diligently and competently but also
even when they do not make a competent litigation move, they are still
required to tell the client of this mistake because attorneys have a duty to
disclose all material facts pertaining to the case.8 6
Whether an attorney has breached a fiduciary duty is a question of
fact.8 Unlike the legal malpractice cause of action, an action for breach
of fiduciary duty may be, and often is, based on violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct." When both legal malpractice and breach of
fiduciary duty causes of action are alleged, many courts analyze the duty
and breach elements separately but use one causation analysis for both.8 9
exists, the attorney's lips are forever sealed, and this is true, notwithstanding his subsequent discharge
by his client and notwithstanding lack of any justification for such action.").
82. In Wutchumna Water Co v. Bailey, the California Supreme Court went on to say:
It is the general and well-settled
render services professionally in
in the same case or not, can he
very interests he was engaged to

rule that an attorney who has acted as such for one side cannot
the same case to the other side, nor, in any event, whether it be
assume a position hostile to his client, and one inimical to the
protect.

Id. (quoting In re Boone, 83 F. 944, 952 (N.D. Cal. 1897).
8 3. Id.
84. See Benasra v. Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 628 (Ct. App. 2004)
(discussing that a final analysis of a case hinges on attorney's failure to exhibit loyalty to client when
approached by an adverse party); Watchumna Water Co., 15 P.2d at 508 (explaining the test of
inconsistency is whether an attorney accepting a new client will require him or her to do anything
injurious to a former client in any matter in which the attorney formerly represented him).
85. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013) (explaining when a
written statement is necessary when dealing with a conflict of interest).
86. See id. r. 1.4 (discussing lawyer-client communications).

87. David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr 339, 342 (Ct. App. 1988).
88. See Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr 2d 768, 777 (Ct. App. 1995) (explaining a cause of
action for breach of fiduciary is a species of its own because the Rules of Professional Conduct help
define the fiduciary duty an attorney owes to a client).
89. See id. at 783 (analyzing the two elements for both breach of fiduciary duty and legal
malpractice).
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The rules governing causation in legal malpractice actions also govern
actions for the breach of a fiduciary duty.90 However, the "case-within-acase" requirement of showing "but for" causation in legal malpractice is
not necessarily required when an attorney breaches a fiduciary duty.9 1 The
fiduciary duty cause of action may succeed regardless of the outcome of
the underlying case or transaction in which the attorney was hired to
represent the plaintiff.92
A client is entitled to recover damages for all harms caused by the
breach of a fiduciary duty.' 3 More remedies are available for a client
alleging breach of a fiduciary duty than one alleging legal malpractice. 9 4
For example, a client can obtain disqualification of an attorney in a conflict
of interest situation, or recover financial, emotional distress, punitive, or
physical damages.' 5
Punitive damages are not recoverable for legal
negligence but may be recoverable if a breach of a fiduciary duty is
accompanied by malice, fraud, or oppression constituting an extreme level
of indifference to a client's rights.'
Several cases have highlighted the special nature of the attorney-client
relationship and how attorneys are held to the highest standard of ethical
behavior. In Sanguinetti v. Rossen,' the court stated an attorney "should be
a paragon of candor, fairness, honor, and fidelity in all his dealings with
those who place their trust in his ability and integrity, and he will at all
times, and under all circumstances, be held to the full measure of what he
ought to be."" In addition, the court stated equity would not exist if "a
trusted legal adviser could profit by withholding the benefit of his special

90. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 cmt. i (AM. LAW
INST. 1998) (outlining the rules for both breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice).

91. See Gutierrez v. Girardi, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 214-17 (Ct. App. 2011) (discussing how
"but for" causation is merely an assumption).
92. See id. at 218 (explaining how a breach of fiduciary duty claim is not tied to the outcome of
the underlying cause of action).
93. See REBECCA A. WISEMAN & SARA CHURCH REESE, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE:
CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL CLAIMS & DEFENSES S 3:565, Westlaw (database updated Aug.
2015) (discussing recovery of damages from breach of fiduciary duty (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979))).
94. See Anderson & Steele, Jr., supra note 65, at 236 (suggesting "the emerging action for breach
of fiduciary duty... may offer the greatest potential for recovery" when compared with remedies
available in legal malpractice cases).

95. Id. at 255.
96. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 685, 71011 (Ct. App. 2002) (describing when punitive damages can be recovered for a breach of fiduciary

duty).
97. Sanguinetti v. Rossen, 107 P. 560 (Cal. Ct. App. 1906).
98. Id. at 563.
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knowledge and skill, or by giving false counsel during the continuance of a
relation in the highest sense confidential and fiduciary."" There, the
attorney "failed to protect his clients in every possible way."'o The court
stated, "It was a gross violation of that duty for him to mislead or deceive
them."' The court went on to explain, "Had he retained the legal title
obtained in the manner described in the answer, the most adventurous
sophist would hardly assert that he could be protected by his breach of
duty, and allowed to retain that which was obtained through his guile."' 0 2
In In re Lee's Estate,'0 3 the court stated an attorney owes his clients duty
to act with utmost loyalty to their real interests and held an attorney who
breaches his duty to his clients forfeits his right to compensation.'o The
court explained:
It is equally well settled that an attorney at law who is unfaithful in the
performance of his duties forfeits his right to compensation. An attorney is
an officer of the court, sworn to aid in the administration of justice and to
act with strict fidelity to both his clients and the courts. Unquestioned
fidelity to their real interests is the duty of every attorney to his clients. When
a breach of faith occurs, the attorney's right to compensation is gone. 0 5
In Demov, Monis, Levin & Shein v. Glantr,,1 0 6 the court stated the
attorney-client relationship was "founded in principle upon the elements
of trust and confidence on the part of the client and of undivided loyalty
and devotion on the part of the attorney, [and] remains one of the most
sensitive and confidential relationships in our society."' In addition,
[the attorney-client relationship is] built upon a high degree of trust and
confidence [and] is obviously more susceptible to destructive forces than are
other less sensitive ones. It follows, then, that an attorney cannot represent
a client effectively and to the full extent of his or her professional capability
unless the client maintains the utmost trust and confidence in the
attorney. 0 8

99. Id.
100. See id. (emphasizing an attorney who lied and misled clients grossly violated his duty to
protect clients in every possible way).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. In re Lee's Estate, 9 N.W.2d 245 (Minn. 1943).
104. Id. at 251.
105. Id.
106. Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 428 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 1981).
107. Id. at 389.
108. Id.
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The court in Campagnola v. Mulbolland, Minion & Roe' attributed the
need to hold attorneys "to the highest standard of ethical behavior" to the
"role attorneys play in the vindication of individual rights in our
society.""o
III.

HISTORY AND GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE AMERICAN RULE

The American Rule is the general policy that all litigants must bear their
own attorney's fees."' Having been followed for more than two hundred
years, the Rule's historical roots reach as far back as the beginning of the
United States federal system.1 1 2 In 1796, in Arcambel v. Wiseman,"1 the
Supreme Court held each party had to pay its own attorney's fees and
stated it did not believe attorney's fees should be awarded because "the
general practice of the United States is in opposition to it; and even if that
practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of
the court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute."' 1 4
In 1853, Congress enacted legislation limiting the award of attorney's
fees in trials "before a jury, in civil and criminal causes, or before referees,
or on a final hearing in equity or admiralty, a docket fee of twenty
dollars .... [i]n cases at law, where judgment is rendered without a jury,
ten dollars, and five dollars where a cause is discontinued."' 1 5
In colonial America, the early courts "routinely awarded attorney's fees
to the successful litigant."' 1 6 However, after the American Revolution,
courts abandoned this English practice because the revolution created
resentment toward anything English, and colonists felt distrust and open
hostility toward the legal profession.' 1 7 In addition, attorneys did not play
a large role in the administration of justice because many judges did not
have a formal legal education and litigants represented themselves. 1
Thus, the assistance of legal counsel was seen as an unnecessary luxury.1 1 9

109. Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 555 N.E.2d 611 (N.Y. 1990).
110. Id. at 614.
111. Daniel H. Fehderau, Comment, Rule 11 and the Court's Inherent Power to Shift Attorng's Fees-

An Analysis of TheirCompeting Objectiyes andAppications, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 701, 702-03 (1993).
112. See id. (arguing to reduce sanctions available under the supervisory powers of the court).

113. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
114. Id. at 306.
115. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161-62 (1855).
116. Lawrence D. Rose, Note, Atorng's Fee Recoveg in Bad Faith Cases: New Diretionsfor Change,

57 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 505 (1984).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 506.
119. Id.
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Lastly, there was an important emphasis on individualism. 1 2 0 Requiring
an unsuccessful litigant to pay the prevailing litigant's attorney's fees was
like "hitting a man when he is down" because it penalizes the individual
for asserting his rights.1 2 ' Attorney-fee recovery also inhibited equal
access to the courts because access could only be assured if litigants were
required to pay their own costs and fees.'122
The most common argument supporting the American Rule is that
people, particularly the poor, might be unjustly discouraged from initiating
a lawsuit if they have to pay attorney's fees should they lose.' 2 Another
argument for the American Rule is that because the outcome of a lawsuit
is uncertain, litigants should not be penalized for exercising their rights to
prosecute or defend a lawsuit. 12 4 A third argument indicates that there is
an issue with trial courts determining what amount is reasonable when
awarding attorney's fees because attorney's fees are highly speculative and
vary depending on the attorney, client, and legal matter.1 25 Requiring
courts to determine what is reasonable also prolongs litigation and
increases each party's expenses.' 2 6
Another argument in favor of the American Rule is that when litigants
know the losing party pays the prevailing party's fees, there is a possibility
that the parties will not make reasonable attempts to settle their case,
resulting in inflated fee estimates after litigation.1 27 The final argument is
that the American Rule helps preserve independent advocacy because if
attorneys who know that the judge controls their compensation, they
might be less zealous in making certain decisions or arguing their client's
case for fear of upsetting the judge.' 2 8
Nevertheless, there are several arguments against the American Rule.
The American Rule encourages frivolous lawsuits because, by not adding
the risk of paying the opposing side's attorney's fees, litigants are not
otherwise deterred from continuing potentially frivolous lawsuits."' The
120. Id
121. Id. (quoting Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 877 (1929)).
122. Id.
123. Moore, supra note 9, at 1151; see also Rose, supra note 116, at 513 ("[P]oor litigants ...
be more prone to settle their claims prematurely.").
124. Moore, supra note 9, at 1151.

125.
126.
127.
128.

will

Id
Id.
Id.
Id

129. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The InjuredPerson's Access to
justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1591 (1993) (comparing arguments for and against the American

Rule).
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lack of incentive also encourages abusive litigation practices. 13 0 The
plaintiff only pays his own costs and fees if he loses the case.1 3 ' The risk
of paying the prevailing litigant's attorney's fees would motivate litigating
parties to stop these abusive practices and settle their cases, effectively
relieving court dockets of unnecessary litigation.1 32
Similarly, the American Rule prevents litigants from defending
meritorious claims because while "individuals and organizations with
substantial resources ... can afford to pay legal costs and withstand the
effects of delay," a party lacking such resources cannot.1 3 3
Individuals with little exposure to the legal system are at a disadvantage
when litigating against organizations like insurance companies and similar
corporations "that have frequent contacts and ongoing relationships with
the legal system" because of the disparity in knowledge of the legal
system.' 3 4 That is, organizations have an advantage when coming into
litigation because of their experience, bargaining power, investment in
resources that produce favorable rules, and influence over legal rules
gained through lobbying.' 3 5
Moreover, the American Rule denies full recovery to plaintiffs.' 6 For
example, in tort and contract cases, the plaintiff only recovers the amount
necessary to compensate for her loss. 13 7

Compensatory damages are

meant to put the plaintiff in the position she would have been "had the
defendant not harmed the plaintiff or breached the contract. "138
Generally, in tort and contract actions, plaintiffs may only recover
compensatory damages.' 3 ' The plaintiff must pay her own attorney's fees

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1596.

134. See id. (citing Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on limits of Legal

Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 99-100 (1974) (discussing how Professor Galanter distinguished
legally unsophisticated litigants from their more experienced counter parts, categorizing them as "one
shot players" and "repeat players," respectively)).
135. See id. (describing the factors that contribute to the imbalance between parties with
ongoing exposure to the legal system and those parties that have little to no experience navigating the
legal system).
136. See Moore, supra note 9, at 1149 (noting the criticisms of the American Rule regarding
attorney's fees).
137. See id. (emphasizing the limitations in available recoveries under the American Rule).
138. Id. at 1150; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 1981) (outlining available judicial remedies in contract actions); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 901 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (describing how to determine the amount of damages in
tort actions).
139. Moore, supra note 9, at 1150.
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and may instruct the attorney to take the fee from the net proceeds
recovered as compensatory damages. 14 0 At times, punitive damages or
pain and suffering damages might indirectly cover the attorney's fees in
some tort cases. 1 4 ' However, courts have refused to award the fees as
damages because of the American Rule.1 4 2 As a result, plaintiffs
recovering only compensatory damages are not made whole because they
must pay their attorneys out of the award.' 4
IV.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE AMERICAN RULE

Despite the persistence of the American Rule, American courts have
awarded attorney's fees in a significant number of cases and have
recognized several exceptions to the rule.'" First, courts have allowed
the shifting of attorney's fees when litigation arises as a result of a
contractual dispute.' 4 s This is limited, however, to when contractual
clauses provide for the payment of attorney's fees.' 4 6 The clauses are only
disfavored and unenforceable when they are contrary to public policy.' 4 7
Also, this discussion focuses on unilateral fee-shifting clauses, such as
those found in residential lease agreements, mortgage agreements and
other standardized form contracts.' 4 8 The existence of unilateral feeshifting contracts raises many of the same issues as other attempts to
provide a fair way to afford smaller parties the opportunity to litigate to
uphold their rights without facing extreme hardship if they do not

140. Id.
141. See id (discussing available plaintiff recovery options under the American Rule). In
medical malpractice cases, for example, plaintiffs can recover pain and suffering damages and
emotional distress damages, which can help to cover the cost of the attorney's fees. See Bruce I.
McDaniel, Recovery for Mental or Emotional Distress Resulingfrom Injug to, or Death of Member of Plaintifs

Family Arisingfrom Physician's or Hospital's Wrongful Conduct, 77 A.L.R.3d 447 (1977) (outlining the
available recovery a plaintiff can be awarded for mental or emotional distress in a medical malpractice
suit).
142. See Moore, supra note 9, at 1150 ("Although courts and commentators have criticized the
American Rule ... courts have justified the rule based on countervailing policy considerations.").

143. Id.
144. See id at 1143-44 (explaining exceptions to the American Rule some jurisdictions make).
145. See Vargo, supra note 129, at 1578 (discussing the exceptions to the American Rule
regarding attorney's fees in contract cases).
146. Contractual agreements that incorporate such fee-shifting provisions include promissory
notes and insurance contracts. Id.
147. See id. at 1579 (discussing when courts provide exceptions to the American Rule regarding
attorney's fees in contract claims).
148. See Jeffrey C. Bright, UnilateralAttorney'sFees Clauses:A Pmposalto Shift to the Golden Rule, 61
DRAKE L. REV. 85, 89 (2012) (explaining the type of adhesion contracts that often include unilateral
clauses for attorney's fees).
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prevail.' 4 9 Although unilateral fee-shifting clauses are manifestly unfair,
particularly when you have the traditional imbalances of bargaining power
and information that accompany these types of contracts, only seven states
provide that these are unlawful and require fees to be reciprocal."so Six
states have placed some limitations on the enforceability of unilateral feeshifting agreements.1 5 1 Most states, however, do not regulate or restrict
the use of unilateral attorney's fees clauses.
A.

ContractualAgreements

Courts have generally been willing to uphold fee-shifting provisions in
contractual agreements-and indeed, many attorneys routinely include feeshifting clauses in their agreements. The State Bar of California has a
model fee-shifting provision:
The prevailing party in any action or proceeding arising out of or to
enforce any provision of this Agreement, with the exception of a fee
arbitration or mediation under Business and Professions Code Sections
6200-6206, will be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
that action or proceeding, or in the enforcement of any judgment or award
rendered.1 5 3

This provision only applies in cases focusing on breach of contract, not
negligence actions, and only helps if the drafter incorporates such a
clause.' 5 4

149. See id. at 90 (describing the unfairness of unilateral attorney's fees clauses due to unequal
bargaining power, oppressive effect against a wronged party, and public policy concerns).

150. Id. at 89 n.12 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN.
(West 2006 & Supp. 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 607-14 (1993 & Supp. 2007); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 28-3-704 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20.096 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.84.330

§ 57.105(7)

(West 2006 & Supp. 2012) (identifying statutes in California, Florida, Hawaii, Montana, Oregon,
Utah, and Washington)).

151. Id. at 114 n.142 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-150bb (West 2012); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4344, 7613 (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 186, § 20 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 361 -C:2 (LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-48 (LexisNexis 2011);
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 234 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2012) (discussing Connecticut, Delaware,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and New York as providing limited reciprocal
attorney's fees statutes on consumer, installment, and residential lease contracts)).
152. See id. at 114-15 (explaining thirty-one states have no restrictions on unilateral attorney's
fee clauses).
153. Optional Clauses and Disclosure Forms, STATE BAR OF CAL. (July 24, 2015),
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/mfa/2015/2015_OptionalClausesandDisclosureFo

rms2-0701115_r.pdf.
154. Id.
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Common FundDoctrine

Another exception to the American Rule, the common fund
doctrine, is found where courts "award attorney's fees to litigants whose
efforts create or protect a 'common fund' from which the members of a
class may seek recovery."s The fees "are recoverable from the proceeds
of the fund itself rather than an opposing party." 1 5 6 The purpose of this
exception is "to prevent the unjust enrichment of those who have
benefited from the litigant's efforts.""s' The common fund doctrine has
been applied to several situations, including antitrust litigation and class
actions.' 5 " For the court to properly shift the attorney's fees under the
common fund doctrine: (1) a fund must already exist prior to litigation; (2)
the court must be able to exert control over the fund and; (3) the
beneficiaries of the fund must be identifiable.1 5 9
C.

PrivateAttorney GeneralDoctrine

Another common exception to the American Rule is the "private
attorney general doctrine," which allows a prevailing litigant to recover
attorney's fees incurred during litigation of suits that promote important
public policy.1 6 o In California, the legislature incorporated the exception
in the California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP)."' Under CCP Section
1021.5, attorney's fees may be awarded "to a successful party ... in any
action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right
affecting the public interest," if three requirements are satisfied.1 6 2
Under the private attorney general doctrine, a significant benefit must
have "been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons"
and "the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of
enforcement by one public entity against another public entity" make the
award appropriate, and "in the interest of justice," the attorney's fees
should not be paid out of the recovery."' In line with this policy, there

155. Rose, spra note 116, at 509.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 510.
158. See Vargo, supra note 129, at 1581 (explaining how federal and state courts use the
common fund doctrine as an exception to the American Rule on attorney's fees).
159. Id.
160. Rose, supra note 116, at 510.
161. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 5 1021.5 (West 2015) (allowing attorney's fees to be awarded in
suits concerning important public benefit).
162. Id.
163. Id; see also Vargo, supra note 129, at 1588 (explaining fee-shifting legislation, such as
section 1021.5, is intended to encourage attorneys to take on "public interest" litigation).
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are hundreds of federal and state statutes that provide for shifting
attorney's fees.'16 There are different purposes for each statute, including
compensating the plaintiff, punishing or deterring the defendant attorney
for misconduct, preventing abuse of the judicial system, or promoting
public interest litigation.1 6 5 The most notable are public interest statutes,
including the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976166 and the
Equal Access to Justice Act.' 6 7
D.

Civil Rights Statutes

Federal courts and agencies award attorney's fees in accordance with
differing federal fee-shifting statutes enacted to encourage private litigation
in furtherance of public policy.' 6'
Attorney's fees awards are "often
designed to help equalize contests between private individual plaintiffs and
corporate or governmental defendants.,"16' Thus, such award provisions
are found most often in statutes concerning civil rights, consumer
protection, and environmental protection.' 7 0 The following sets forth
some of the differing ways federal courts provide for attorney's fees
awards.

164. See Vargo, supra note 129, at 1588 ("There are over 200 federal statutes and almost 2,000
state statutes that provide for shifting of attorney's fees.").

165. Id.
166. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976 allows the payment of reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing party in certain civil rights cases and provides
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be
held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of
such officer's jurisdiction.

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012).
167. The Equal Access to justice Act authorizes the payment of attorney's fees to a prevailing
party in an action against the United States, unless the court finds that the government's position in
the litigation was substantially justified, stating in pertinent part,
a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses ...
incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including
proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any
court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2012).
168. See HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-970, AWARDs OF ATTORNEYS' FEES BY
FEDERAL COURTS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES 64-114 (2008) [hereinafter COHEN] (discussing
different federal statutes that authorize an award of attorney's fees).

169. Id.
170. Id. at Summary.
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UnilateralFee-Sbffting

Under the unilateral fee-shifting method, the relevant statute provides
that only one party can be awarded its attorney's fees."' For example, the
Fair Labor Standards Act fee provision is unilateral in that it provides a fee
remedy only to prevailing plaintiffs, with the exclusion of fee awards to
prevailing defendants. 1 7 2 There, the Fair Labor Standards Act prohibits
employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations from
discriminating in the amount of wages against employees on the basis of
sex.' 7 3 The attorney-fee provision states: "[The court] shall, in addition to
any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable
attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action."' 7 4
Similarly, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, which
prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of age against
individuals who are at least forty years old,17 5 authorizes the court to allow
a fee award to be paid to the prevailing plaintiff by the defendant, in
addition to the costs of the action.' 7 6 Moreover, the Age Discrimination
Act of 1975, which makes it unlawful to discriminate in programs or
activities receiving federally financed assistance,
authorizes the courts
to award both the costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing plaintiff.1 7 1

Additionally, the Equal Access to justice Act (EAJA) awards attorney's
fees as against the United States in two situations. In the first situation,
the United States is liable for a prevailing party's attorney's fees "in any
civil action brought by or against the United States.""' The United States
is rendered liable for fees "to the same extent that any other party would
be under the common, law and statutory exceptions to the American
171. See e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (indicating that a losing party is not entitled to attorneys'
fees).
172. See id. ("In addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, [the court shall]
allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.'.

173. Id. 206(d).
174. Id( 216(b).
175. Id. §§ 623, 631(a).
176. See id. § 626(b) (maintaining that an award for attorney's fees may be awarded upon a
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).

177. See 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (2012) ("It is the purpose of this chapter to prohibit discrimination
on the basis of age in programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance.").
178. See id. § 6104 (authorizing reasonable attorney's fees to be paid to a prevailing plaintiff by
the defendant in addition to any costs of the action).

179. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2012) (establishing a court may award attorney's fees and
reasonable costs incurred in any civil action to the prevailing party "brought by or against the United
States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity in any
court having jurisdiction of such action").
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[R]ule, including the statutory exceptions that do not specifically authorize
fee awards against the United States.""so In the second situation, the
United States is liable for attorney's fees of prevailing parties for specified
agency adjudications and all civil actions brought by or against the United
States.1 "' This is limited, however, to the finding that the United States
was not substantially justified in its position or that special circumstances
would not have otherwise rendered an award unjust.1 a 2 In addition, there
must be a fee cap of $125 per hour, unless the court or agency determines
special circumstances justify a higher fee. 1 83
Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows the Attorney General to
bring civil actions on behalf of any person who is unable to initiate legal
proceedings on his own and who claims he was deprived of the equal
protection of the laws on account of his race, color, religion, or national
origin.' 8 4 The fee-shifting provision provides that the United States is
liable for costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee to a prevailing
plaintiff.' 8

F.

5

RecjtrocalFee-Sh[fting

Nevertheless, a number of federal and state statutes provide for
reciprocal fee-shifting, where an equal standard is employed for both
prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants. For example, the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act prohibits any person, business, or governmental
agency that extends credit from discriminating against any credit applicant,
180. COHEN, supra note 168, at 6. Unlike the remaining provisions of the EAJA, this provision
does not limit a fee award by the number of employees or assets of parties eligible for recovery. 28
U.S.C. § 2412. In addition, there are no maximum hourly rates for fee awards. Id.
181. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (excluding tort and tax cases, "a court shall award to a
prevailing party ... fees and other expenses ... incurred by that party in any civil action, including
proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States").
182. "Substantially justified" has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as "reasonableness in

law and fact." H.R. REP. NO. 96-1434, at 22 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5003,
5011.
183. The fee-shifting provision is further limited-fees are not to be awarded to an individual
whose net worth is in excess of $2 million or to businesses or organizations (including local
governments) with a net worth exceeding $7 million or employing more than 500 employees with
The two exceptions include tax-exempt
5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B) (2012).
two exceptions.
organizations and agricultural cooperatives; these entities may recover fees regardless of their net
worth but apparently may not recover fees if they have more than 500 employees. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(2)(B); see also Unification Church v. INS, 762 F.2d 1077, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (reading the
statute to make the "500-employee limit" applicable to tax exempt organizations).
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000b(a) (2012) (authorizing the Attorney General to institute a civil action
for or in the name of the United States).
185. See id. § 2000b-1 ("In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the United States
shall be liable for costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, the same as a private person.").
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in part, on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital
status, or age.' 8 6 Costs of the action in conjunction with reasonable
attorney's fees, as determined by the court, are added to any damages
award to either prevailing party.1 8 7
Similarly, the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "prevailing party"
in the Copyright Act,' 8 8 as treating a prevailing plaintiff the same as a
prevailing defendant in determining the appropriateness of a fee award.'
Under the Copyright Act, it is unlawful to copy a work of authorship
without authorization.' 9 0 The fee-shifting provision reads in relevant
award a reasonable attorney's fee to the
part: "[The court may ...
prevailing party as part of the costs."19
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) also contains reciprocal fee-shifting
provisions. For example, much like the EAJA, Section 7430 of the
Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Internal Revenue Service and
federal courts to award attorney's fees of up to $125 an hour in tax cases in
which the United States fails to establish that its position in the
proceedings was substantially justified. 19 2 However, it is different from
the EAJA because Section 7430 does preclude the government from
paying a fee award where special circumstances would make an award
unjust.1 9 3 Another provision in the IRC allows the Tax Court to impose
upon taxpayers, whose attorneys "unreasonably and vexatiously" multiply
the proceedings in any case, to personally pay the excess costs, expenses,
and attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.' 9 4 If

186. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2012).
187. See id. 5 1691e(d) ("In the case of any successful action ... of this section, the costs of the
action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court, shall be added to any
damages awarded by the court. .. ").

188. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).
189. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994) ("Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing
defendants are to be treated alike . . . .").

190. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner ...

is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be.").

191. Id. § 505.
192. See I.R.C. § 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) (2012) (determining "such fees shall not be in excess of $125
per hour unless the court determines that a special factor ...

193. See id.

5 7430(b)

justifies a higher rate").

(placing limits in which litigation costs will be awarded, including that a

prevailing party exhaust the administrative remedies available and costs must be allocable to only the
United States, and the prevailing party must not unreasonably protract from the proceeding).
194. Id. § 6673(a)(2)(A) ("Whenever it appears to the Tax Court that any attorney or other
person admitted to practice before the Tax Court has multiplied the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously, the Tax Court may require that such attorney or other person pay
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct. . . .').
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such attorney represents the IRS, then the United States must pay the
amount awarded."'s
In addition to the federally enacted fee-shifting statutes, seven states
have enacted reciprocal attorney's fees statutes.' 9 6 These statutes are
triggered when parties form contracts containing unilateral attorney's fees
clauses that favor one party. The statutes reform the contract to mandate
a reciprocal attorney's fee clause to favor either party that prevails, not just
the named party in the contract.' 9 7 That is, these statutes reform
unilateral attorney's fees clauses to apply reciprocally toward both parties.
In addition, six other states provide reciprocal attorney's fees by statutes
that are applicable in a more limited context, specific to certain types of
contracts: consumer contracts, installment contracts, and residential
leases.' 9 8
G.

The DualFee-Shifting Standard

Although the fee-shifting provisions of a majority of civil rights statutes
are seemingly reciprocal, the Supreme Court applies a dual standard in
determining the appropriateness of fee awards.' 9 9 That is, in the face of
otherwise facially neutral civil rights statutes, the Court treats the
appropriateness of fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs differently than it
does to prevailing defendants. 2 00 For example, the majority of federal feeId.
195. See id. § 6673(a)(2)(B) ("[Iif such attorney is appearing on behalf of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, that the United States pay such excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees in the
same manner as such an award by a district court.").
196. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.

19 7. Id.
198. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.

199. See generally Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417-21 (1978)
(suggesting Congress intended a dual standard should be applied when determining the
appropriateness of fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants).
200. See id. at 418 ("[There are at least two strong equitable considerations counseling an
attorney's fee award to a prevailing ... plaintiff that are wholly absent in the case of a prevailing ...
defendant."). When the Supreme Court interprets an attorney's fees provision of one civil rights
statute, it applies the same interpretation to attorney's fees provisions of all civil rights statutes
because they are all generally based on the fee-shifting provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See
id. at 415-18 (noting the statute on its face provides "no indication whatever of the circumstances
under which either a plaintiff or defendant should be entitled to attorney's fees"). The Court notes
similar language in a fee-shifting statute is a ".strong indication' they are to be interpreted alike."

Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n.2 (1989) (quoting Northcross v.
Memphis Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973)). For example, the Court in Albemarle PaperCo. v.
Moody held the standard of awarding attorneys' fees in Newman

v.

Piggie Park Entepries, Inc., 390 U.S.

400 (1968), which dealt with Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b), was
equally applicable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). See Albemarle
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shifting provisions allow courts to award attorneys' fees to the "prevailing
20
party," the "substantially prevailing party," or to the "successful" party.
Although facially neutral, the Court ordinarily awards attorney's fees to
prevailing plaintiffs in such cases, with the minor limitation excluding an
award where the circumstances otherwise render the award unjust.202 A
prevailing defendant, on the other hand, can only recover where the
plaintiff brought a suit that was vexatious, frivolous, or intended to harass
or embarrass the defendant.2 0 3
The Court holds strong equitable considerations counsel a dual standard
in assessing fee awards for either prevailing party because "[a]warding fees
to prevailing plaintiffs in the ordinary case will encourage suits to vindicate
the public interest, but awarding fees to defendants in the ordinary case
might have a chilling effect on the institution of such suits. Awarding fees
204
to defendants in frivolous cases, however, may discourage such suits."
In addition to civil rights statutes, the Court's dual standard is also applied
in federal environmental statutes as well as under the Truth in Lending
Act, although it is seemingly "more difficult for an environmental plaintiff
than a civil rights plaintiff to recover an attorney fee." 2 0 5
The following are facially neutral statutes that are nevertheless held to
the dual standard. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act) prohibits
segregation and discrimination based on color, race, religion, or national
origin in places of public accommodation whose operations affect
interstate commerce. 20 6 Such places include, but are not limited to,
2 07
The
hotels, restaurants, gas stations, and exhibitions of entertainment.
court, in its discretion, may allow the
fee award provision provides: "[he

Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975) (holding the Piggie Park standard of awarding
attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff is equally applicable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)).
201. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983).
202. See Chrisdansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421 (suggesting a prevailing plaintiff should
recover attorney's fees unless circumstances would render an award unfair).
203. See id. (asserting that prevailing defendants should recover only "upon a finding that the
plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in
subjective bad faith").
204. COHEN, supra note 168, at 13.
205. See id. at 14 (attributing this fact to the Supreme Court's decision in Ruckelshaus (citing
MARY F. DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES 8-9 (Matthew

Bender ed., 1997))).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012) ("All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of
race, color, religion, or national origin.").
207. See id. (listing which establishments are affected by the legislation).
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prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs." 20 8

In addition, Title VII of the Act prohibits

employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of sex, race,
color, national origin, and religion. 20 9 The fee-shifting provision reads:
"In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailingpary . . a reasonable attorney's fee . .
as part of the costs." 2 1 0 Similarly, Title VIII of the Civil Rights (Fair
Housing) Act of 1968, which prohibits discrimination based on "race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin in the sale or rental of
housing,"" has a similar attorney's fee provision where "the prevailing
party, other than the United States, [may recover] a reasonable attorney's
fee and costs," with the United States liable for such fees and costs to the
same extent as a private person.2 1 2
Finally, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,
provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1982,214 1983,215 1985,216 and 1986217 of this tide, tide IX
of Public Law 92-318...218 the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1981,'213 ...

208. Id. § 2000a-3(b).
209. See id. § 2000e-3 ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment ...
based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. . . .").

210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.

( 2000e-5(k)

(emphasis added).

3604.
§ 3614(d)(2).

213. Id. § 1981 ("[The right] to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.").
214. Id. § 1982 ("All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property.").
215. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
imunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.").
216. Id. § 1985 (allowing an injured or deprived party to recover damages if two or more people
conspire to interfere with that party's civil rights).
217. Id. § 1986.("Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be
done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to
prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such
wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured ...
for all damages caused by such
wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented.").

218. See general# 20 U.S.C.

§§

1681-88 (2012) (codifying a portion of Title IX).
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1993

... ,219 title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964... ,220 or [Section
40302 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994],221 the court, in its

discretion, may allow the prevailingparty, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.2 22
H. Bad Faith Exception
Lastly, under the "bad faith exception," a court "may assess attorney's
fees .

.

. when a party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for

oppressive reasons.' 22 1 Unless forbidden by Congress, exceptions of this
nature "are unquestionably assertions of inherent power in the courts to
allow attorneys' fees in particular situations. "2
Although the exception
originated as a means for compensating plaintiffs, courts have also evoked
it to compensate defendants.2 2 5
1.

History of the Bad Faith Doctrine

Federal courts first used the exception "to award costs, including
attorneys' fees, to trustees who incurred those costs by litigating on behalf
of a trust."2 2
In Trustees v. Greenough,"2 the Supreme Court held these
awards to trustees were not prohibited, explaining
[t]he fee-bill is intended to regulate only those fees and costs which are
strictly chargeable as between party and party, and not to regulate the fees of
counsel and other expenses and charges as between solicitor and client, nor
the power of a court of equity, in cases of administration of funds under its

219. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (2012) (preventing the enforcement of laws that substantially
burden a person's free exercise of religion).

220. See id. § 2000d (prohibiting discrimination on the basis "of race, color, or national origin"
in programs or activities that receive financial assistance from the federal government).
221. See id. § 13981 (promulgating a federal civil remedy for victims of violence motivated by
gender, based on Congress's authority under Article I, Section 8 and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution). Section 40302 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 was

held unconstitutional in United States v. Monison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
223. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 245, 258-59 (1975)
(quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)
(describing factors a court will consider when allowing attorney's fees)), superseded 1y statute, Civil

Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976).
224. Id. at 259.
225. See id. at 247 n.18, 264 n.37 (explaining the historical origins of the American Rule from
English common law); see also M. Brinkley Morse, Note, Attorneys'Fees-Nemeroff v. Abelson and the

Bad Faith Exception to the Ameuican Rule, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1519, 1524 (1984) (stating the court's ability
to award attorney's fees to defendants, despite the fees originally being reserved for plaintiffs only).

226. Morse, supra note 225, at 1523.
227. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
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control, to make such allowance to the parties out of the fund as justice and
equity may require.22
In Vaughan v. Atkinson, 22 9 the Court held the plaintiff was entitled to
reasonable attorney's fees because of the shipowner's bad faith.2 3 0 The
plaintiff, a sailor, sued the defendant shipowner for maintenance and cure
and for damages resulting from the shipowner's failure to pay maintenance
and cure. 2 ' After serving on the shipowner's vessel, the plaintiff spent
three months in a U.S. Public Health Service Hospital and two years as an
outpatient undergoing treatment for tuberculosis.2 3 2 The shipowner
ignored the plaintiffs request for maintenance as an outpatient.233 As a
result, the plaintiff was forced to hire an attorney and agreed to pay a 50%
contingency fee.2 3 4 The Court declared that an ill seaman was entitled to
The plaintiff was therefore entitled to
maintenance and cure.23
reasonable attorney's fees because the shipowner had acted in bad faith.2 3 6
The bad faith exception reflects the Vaughan Court's adept judgmentthat malfeasant behavior warrants punishment, and victims deserve full
23
Therefore, courts should not hinder the victim's full
compensation.
23 8
recovery by applying the American Rule mechanically.

In Hall v. Cole,2 3 ' a union member was expelled after presenting
resolutions that violated a union rule. 2 40 The union member sued, and
the district court permanently reinstated him in the union, granting him
attorney's fees. 2"' The Court held-although the American Rule does not
traditionally allow awards of attorney's fees unless there is a statute or
228. Id. at 535.
229. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
230. See id. at 530-31 (recognizing the defendant-shipowner willingly breached its duty to pay
maintenance and cure owed to a formerly employed sailor). Maintenance and cure is a right afforded
to seamen, "designed to provide a seaman with food and lodging when he becomes sick or injured in
the ship's service; and it extends during the period when he is incapacitated to do a seaman's work
and continues until he reaches maximum medical recovery." Id. at 529, 531.
231. See id. at 527-28 (describing the seaman's cause of action and remedy sought).

232.
233.
234.
235.

See id. at 528 (detailing the plaintiff's medical treatment from 1957-59).
Id. at 528-29.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 531.

236. See id. at 530-31 (awarding damages because the shipowner's "callous" failure to pay
maintenance was "willful and persistent").
237. See Moore, supra note 9, at 1160 (arguing for a "bad faith" application to attorney
malfeasance).
238. See id. (contending a mechanistic application of the bad faith exception potentially deprives
victims of full and just recovery).

239. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
240. Id. at 3.
241. Id.
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contract authorizing the same-federal courts may exercise their equitable
powers and "award attorneys' fees when the interests of justice so
require." 2 4 2
Categories of Bad Faith Exception

2.

Bad faith cases fall into two general categories.2 4 3 The first category
The second category
involves breach of a "well-defined duty." 2 4 4
involves "intentional deprivation of a well-established right." 24 s In
focusing on the merits of the claims presented, courts have previously
awarded fees to plaintiffs: who have had to litigate to enforce legal rights
the defendant unreasonably refused to acknowledge; where a party's
conduct during litigation was intentionally vexatious; and where parties
have been forced to defend against groundless claims. 2 4 6
3.

Purposes for and Problems with the Exception

The bad faith exception has several purposes. 24 7 First, it is punitive
because it deters certain types of misconduct. 24 8 Courts recognize certain
behavior is "so reprehensible that the award of attorney's fees .

.

. is

2 49

Second, the bad faith exception is
necessary to deter the conduct."
compensatory because the wronged party receives compensation for the
damages caused by the offending party's bad faith conduct. 25 o Thus,
victims of bad faith behavior not only receive compensatory damages
directly related to the malfeasance but also attorney's fees incurred through
the course of subsequent litigation are reimbursed as well.2 s"
Lastly, this exception strengthens the integrity of the judicial system
through punishment, deterrence, and compensation. In Hall, the Court
stated: "In this class of cases, the underlying rationale of 'fee shifting' is, of
course, punitive, and the essential element in triggering the award of fees is
therefore the existence of 'bad faith' on the part of the unsuccessful
242. Id. at 4-5.
243. See Moore, supra note 9, at 1159 (introducing the two types of bad faith cases).

244. Id. at 1159-60.
245. Id. at 1159.
246. Morse, supranote 225 at 1524.
247. See Moore, supra note 9, at 1161 (expanding on the three goals of the bad faith exception).
248. See id. (stating the punitive nature of awarding attorney's fees for acting in bad faith toward
opposing counsel).
249. See id. (elaborating on the bad faith exception's intent to discourage parties from engaging
in misconduct so as to avoid being penalized with attorney's fees).
250. See id. (explaining the compensatory nature of awarding attorney's fees to victims of bad
faith conduct).

251. Id.
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litigant."252

'

Applying the exception is problematic, however, because "bad faith is a
difficult term to define." 2 5 3 Even more problematic is adopting a uniform
standard by which courts may award attorney's fees.' As it stands,
courts have discretion to (and must) make fee award decisions on a caseby-case basis. 2 5 5
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (Rule 11) is similar to the bad faith
exception.2s Under Rule 11, if the court determines that the rule has
been violated, then "the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any
attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the
violation." 2 57 Similar to the bad faith exception, Rule 11 provides a court
with discretion to sanction a party who files frivolous pleadings by
awarding attorney's fees to the other side. 25 s Additionally, Rule 11 and
the bad faith exception are both intended to deter attorney misconduct by
punishing frivolous pleadings and compensating parties who are forced to
appear in court to answer those pleadings. 25 9 Rule 11 is more narrowly
tailored, however, because acts that degrade the judicial system are not
sanctionable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2"o In addition,
Rule 11 only applies to "pleading, written motion, and other paper,"
whereas the bad faith exception applies to all conduct during litigation.2
In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,2 6 2 the Supreme Court upheld an
assessment of nearly $1 million in attorney's fees, along with disbarment of

252. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
253. See Moore, supra note 9, at 1161 (stating the standards for identifying bad faith behavior
can be ambiguous).
254. See id. at 1161-62 (noting the struggle trial courts have when trying to determine the
correct standard to apply for the bad faith exception).
255. See id. (explaining the judicial discretion and individualized analysis required to determine
whether to award attorney's fees because of attorney misconduct); see also Hall, 412 U.S. at 5
(discussing federal courts' ability to award attorney's fees when the need arises "in a particular

situation" (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939)).
256. See Moore, supra note 9, at 1162 (comparing the bad faith exception to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

257. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
258. See Moore, supra note 9, at 1162 (discussing the deterrent effect Rule 11 has on attorney
misconduct).
259. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2), (4) (granting courts authority and discretion to award
attorney's fees); see also Moore, supra note 9, at 1162 (discussing similar goals of the bad faith
exception and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
260. See Jacob Singer, Note, Bad FaithFee-Shifing in FederalCourts: What Conduct Quafies, 84 ST.

JOHN'S L. REv. 693, 699 (2010) (comparing FED. R. CIV.P. 11 and the bad faith exception).
261. See id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11).
262. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
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the attorneys involved.2 63
Chambers was the director and sole
shareholder of a company that managed a television station in
Louisiana.2 64 He agreed to sell the station's facilities and broadcast license
to NASCO, Inc. for $18 million.2 6 A condition of the sale was that both
parties submit the required documents to the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) because the sale was subject to FCC approval. 6 6
However, before the sale was completed, Chambers changed his mind and
tried to convince NASCO not to go through with the sale. 2 67 NASCO
refused, and Chambers responded by "inform[ing] NASCO that he would
not file the necessary papers with the FCC." 2 6 8 NASCO sued Chambers
for specific performance and was granted a temporary restraining order
(TRO) to prevent the sale or encumbrance of the property.2 6 9 Chambers
"determined that if the properties were sold to a third party and ... deeds
recorded before the issuance of a TRO, the District Court would lack
jurisdiction. "270 As a result, Chambers attempted to place the property
beyond the jurisdiction of the court by selling the property to a trust
created with his sister as trustee and his children as beneficiaries. 2 71 After
Chambers recorded the transfer of his business to his sister, the judge
called A.J. Gray III-Chambers' attorney-to make sure the property
would remain unencumbered until the hearing.27 2
Gray withheld
information about the sale and recordation. 2 73 After the deeds were
recorded and the trust documents signed, Chambers admitted to
intentionally withholding the information from the court.2 7
Consequently, the trial judge warned Chambers that his conduct had been
unethical.2 7 s Nevertheless, Chambers "continued to abuse the judicial
process," proceeding with "a series of meritless motions and pleadings"
intended to delay litigation.2 7
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 40, 58.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 37.
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 37 (1991).
Id.
Id.
Id.

276. Id. at 38. Specifically, Chambers (1) refused to allow NASCO to inspect the business
records pursuant to an injunction, (2) appealed twice but was denied each time for lack of a final
judgment, (3) filed a series of meridess motions and was warned on each occasion, and (4) attempted
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The district court eventually found that attempting to "deprive th[e]
[c]ourt of jurisdiction by acts of fraud, nearly all of which were performed
outside the confines of th[e] [c]ourt" and attempting "by other tactics of
delay, oppression, harassment and massive expense to reduce plaintiff to
exhausted compliance" did not reach Rule 11 because Rule 11 only
governs documents filed with the court.2 7 7 In addition, "fil[ing] false and
frivolous pleadings" did not reach Rule 11 because "the falsity of the
pleadings at issue did not become apparent until after the trial on the
merits, so it would have been impossible to assess sanctions at the time the
papers were filed." 2 7 8 Therefore, the trial court deemed Rule 11 was
insufficient as a basis for imposing bad faith sanctions against
Chambers.2 7 9
The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court, but ultimately concluded
Rule 11 could have been used as grounds "to sanction Chambers for filing
'false and frivolous pleadings,"' further adding that some of the other bad
conduct "might have reached to other Rules." 2 8 0 However, much of
Chambers' bad faith conduct was beyond the scope of the rules. 2 8
Chambers' "entire course of conduct throughout the lawsuit evidenced
bad faith and an attempt to perpetrate a fraud on the court, and the
conduct sanctionable under the Rules was intertwined within conduct that
only the inherent power could address."2 8
Moreover, the Court
explained:
In circumstances such as these in which all of a litigant's conduct is deemed
sanctionable, requiring a court first to apply Rules and statutes containing
sanctioning provisions to discrete occurrences before invoking inherent
power to address remaining instances of sanctionable conduct would serve
only to foster extensive and needless satellite litigation, which is contrary to
the aim of the Rules themselves. 2 83
Therefore, the Court held that the trial court properly exercised its
inherent power to sanction Chambers' bad faith conduct, stating "that
power is both broader and narrower than other means of imposing
sanctions."2" The Court further explained: "[W]hereas each of the other
to relocate the equipment and begin a new business with FCC. Id. at 38-39.

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 51 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 46.
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mechanisms reaches only certain individuals or conduct, the inherent
power [of a trial court] extends to a full range of litigation abuses. At the
very least, the inherent power must continue to exist to fill in the
interstices." 2 8 5
V.

CURRENT STATE TREATMENT OF ATrORNEY'S FEES IN
LEGAL MALPRACTICE CASES

There is a great divide amongst the states of this nation as to whether or
not to adopt the American Rule with regard to fee shifting in legal
malpractice cases.
This divide reflects two main differing policy
considerations behind the rule's implementation or lack thereof. On one
hand, in states that follow the American Rule, courts lack inherent
authority to shift attorney's fees to the losing party absent express
authority delegated by contract or statute. On the other hand, the states
that do not follow the American Rule generally find that the courts have
inherent authority to weigh differing policy considerations on a case-bycase basis, to determine whether or not fee-shifting would be in the best
interest of justice. Set forth are the different policies adopted by each state
within this country.
In the portion of the country that follows the American Rule in legal
malpractice actions, the courts award attorney's fees to the prevailing party
only when there is an express contractual agreement between the parties,
or when a specific state statute endows the court with authority to shift
litigation fees to the losing party. 2 8 6 Where a state has no stance on
awarding attorney's fees in legal malpractice cases, a determination as to
whether the state applies the American Rule in other contexts will
generally shed light on whether it might do so in the future. 8 In Idaho,
for example, there is no specific rule on legal malpractice, but because the
state follows the American Rule more generally, it may apply it to legal
malpractice suits as well.28

285. Id.
286. Oregon and Tennessee follow this approach. See Rivera-Martinez v. Vu, 263 P.3d 1078,
1082 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (stating Oregon follows the general rule requiring a contractual agreement
or statute authorizing awards of attorney's fees); see also John Kohl & Co. v. Dearborn & Ewing, 977
S.W.2d 528, 534-35 (Tenn. 1998) (noting Tennessee follows the well-established American rule that
no attorney's fees are awarded absent a contractual agreement or statute authorizing the award).
287. See Akers v. Mortensen, 320 P.3d 418, 427 (Idaho 2014) (finding an Idaho statute
authorized the awarding of attorney's fees in a trespass action).
288. Similarly, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming generally uphold the
American Rule. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-54(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); First
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States that follow the American Rule generally adopt the wellestablished bad faith exception.2 89
Not limited to legal malpractice
actions, this exception provides that fees may be shifted to the losing party
when the underlying litigation was executed in bad faith, and the attorney
breached a well-defined duty, or intentionally deprived her client of a wellestablished right. 29 0
Some states have codified the bad faith exception by statute. For
example, Michigan's state statute gives the courts authority to award a
prevailing party the costs and fees incurred by that party in connection
with a civil action if the court finds a pleaded action or defense was made
frivolously.2 9 1
Similarly, Pennsylvania's statute provides reasonable
attorney's fees when the "conduct of another party in commencing the
matter or otherwise was arbitrary, vexatious, or in bad faith." 2 92 Georgia's
state statute authorizes fee shifting where the attorney acted in bad faith,

State Bank v. Metro Dist. Condos. Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 2014 Ark. 48, at 9, 432 S.W.3d 1, 6; Dade

Cry. v. Pena, 664 So. 2d 959, 960 (Fla. 1995); Taomae v. Lingle, 132 P.3d 1238, 1242 (Haw. 2006);
City of Champaign v. Madigan, 2013 IL App (4th) 120662, ¶ 55, 992 N.E.2d 629, 641; Gannon v.
State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1250 (Kan. 2014); Meyr v. Meyr, 7 A.3d 125, 142 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010);
Martinez v. Martinez, 678 P.2d 1163, 1168 (N.M. 1984); Crutchfield v. Marine Power Engine Co.,
2009 OK 27, ¶26, 209 P.3d 295, 304; Pearson v. Pearson, 11 A.3d 103, 108-09 (R.I. 2011);
Blumberg v. Nealco, Inc., 427 S.E.2d 659, 660 (S.C. 1993); Eagle Ridge Estates Homeowners Ass'n
v. Anderson, 2013 SD 21, 1 38, 827 N.W.2d 859, 870; Dowling v. Rowan, 621 S.E.2d 397, 402 (Va.
2005);Bonanno v. Verizon Bus. Network Sys., 2014 VT 24 ,1 18, 96 Vt. 62, 70, 93 A.3d 146, 153;
Dave v. Valdez, 2012 WY 59,1 6, 275 P.3d 485, 487.
289. Courts in Minnesota, Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia have ruled under the bad-faith
exception. Nevertheless, such cases have not dealt with the bad faith exception in legal malpractice
issues. See State ex rel. Crockett v. Robinson, 423 N.E.2d 1099 (Ohio 1981) (concluding that
respondents did not act in bad faith in a claim against them for back pay); State ex rel Bronson v.

Wilkes, 607 S.E.2d 399, 403 (W. Va. 2004) (indicating a prevailing litigant may recover attorney fees
when the losing party has acted in bad faith); see also First Constr. Credit, Inc. v. Simonson Lumber of

Waite Park, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 14, 19-20 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (determining whether the bad faith
exception would apply to the facts of a specific lispendens action); Thomas v. Prudential Secs., Inc.,

921 S.W.2d 847, 851 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ) (affirming an arbitration panel's award of
attorney fees against a litigant who was found to have brought a suit in bad faith against Prudential
for fraud). Maine has a similar exception that awards attorney's fees for extraordinary or egregious

conduct. See Cimenian v. Lumb, 2008 ME 107, ¶ 11, 951 A.2d 817, 820 (holding dishonest testimony
is an example of bad faith and constitutes an extraordinary circumstance justifying the award of

attorney's fees); Soley v. Karl, 2004 ME 89,

111,

853 A.2d 755, 758-59 (discussing whether delaying

trial proceedings by filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition rises to the level required by the standard
of egregious conduct).
290. See Cimenian, 951 A.2d at 820, $ 13 (affirming the award of attorney's fees where the case
was commenced in bad faith).

291. In re Costs & Attorney Fees, 645 N.W.2d 697, 705, 708 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (awarding
attorney's fees to prevailing party for frivolous defense brought by party's attorney (citing MICH.

COMP. LAWS ANN. § 2.625(A)(2)(2001))).
292. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503(9) (West 2010).
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was "stubbornly litigious," or has caused the plaintiff "unnecessary trouble
and expense."293
Nevada's statute provides for a similar exception,
awarding attorney's fees where the attorney pleaded claims that are
frivolous or intended to harass the opposing party. 2 94 However, Nevada's
statute also provides for an additional method the courts can use to award
attorney's fees-namely, where "the prevailing party has not recovered
more than $20,000."2%
Several states following the American Rule have carved out equitable
exceptions. For example, in Washington, the state's highest court held it
would recognize an exception to the American Rule on equitable grounds,
even though it would not recognize one where an attorney breached a
fiduciary duty.2 9 6 The court stated that "[a]n equitable ground exists
'when the natural and proximate consequences of a wrongful act by
defendant involve plaintiff in litigation with others.' 29 '
However,
Washington courts have continued to uphold the American Rule, finding
while a legal malpractice action to recover damages is a traditional legal
remedy, it is not one which the state of Washington recognizes as a viable
means for recovering attorney's fees. 2 "
Additionally, some states have
shifted the burden of paying attorney's fees to the losing party when the
efforts of the attorney created a fund from which fees were to be paid.29
The final common exception adopted by states following the American
Rule is observed where fee shifting is provided for either by the common
law or state rule of court. For example, in Delaware, a litigant cannot
recover attorney's fees unless recovery is authorized by common law or
Massachusetts allows for fee shifting where its rules of
statute. 3 00

293. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-6-11 (West 2010). In Georgia, to be awarded attorney's fees, the
plaintiff must have specially pleaded and made prayer for the award. Id. A Georgia court further
indicated that while pleadings and affidavits may show negligence, "mere negligence will not support
an award of attorney fees based on bad faith." Duncan v. Klein, 720 S.E.2d 341, 347 (Ga. Ct. App.
2011).
294. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 18.010 (West 2010).
295. Id.
The statute notes that any express or implied agreement would trump the
aforementioned law. Id.
296. Shoemake v. Ferrer, 182 P.3d 992, 998 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008), afd sub now. Shoemake ex
rel. Guardian v. Ferrer, 225 P.3d 990, 998 (Wash. 2010).
297. Id. (quoting Flint v. Hart, 917 P.2d 550 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)).
298. Kelly v. Foster, 813 P.2d 598, 600-01 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
299. Alabama provides for such an exception. Bell v. Birmingham News Co., 576 So. 2d 669,
670 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991). Also, Indiana ruled that a court in equity may allow attorney's fees to be
paid out from a fund under its control. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Town of St. John, 751 N.E.2d
657, 659 (Ind. 2001).
300. Began v. Dixon, 547 A.2d 620, 624 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988).

70

ST. MARY'S

JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE &

ETHICs

[Vol. 6:32

"

courtroom procedures authorize it to do so."o' Similarly, in Nebraska, the
court allows for fee shifting where there is a recognized uniform course of
procedure to allow recovery. 30 2
The final line of states that follow the American Rule recognize
uncommonly held exceptions.3 0 3 In Mississippi, for example, in addition
to situations where there is contractual or statutory authority permitting
fee shifting, courts are also given discretion to shift fees in cases where
punitive damages may be properly awarded.3 o Missouri, like Washington,
follows the American Rule with the exception that a wronged party may
only recover damages incurred in the course of collateral litigation. 3 0 s
Some states have been statutorily delegated the authority to award fees
to a prevailing party. Alaska, for example, does not follow the American
Rule and awards attorney's fees to the winner, but state statute "permits a
court to reduce or deny attorney's fees to a prevailing party 'if a given fee
award may be so onerous to the non-prevailing party that it would deter
similarly situated litigants from the voluntary use of the courts."'3 0
Kentucky's state statute authorizes the court to consider the financial
ability of the parties to order a reasonable amount for legal services, which
includes fees for legal services as well as "costs incurred prior to the
commencement of the proceeding or after entry of judgment."'07
In the other portion of the nation, courts are not bound to upholding
the American Rule. Even in the absence of statute or contractual
agreements, courts in these states have inherent authority to shift fees in

301. Cf K.G.M. Custom Homes, Inc. v. Prosky, 10 N.E.3d 117, 126 (Mass. 2014) (determining
there was no statute or court rule authorizing courts to award attorney's fees in actions based on
breach of contract).

302. See Parkert v. Lindquist, 693 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Neb. 2005) (stating the general rule that
recovery of attorney's fees is not allowed unless provided for
procedure).
303. In Wisconsin, the state follows the American Rule with
employment cases under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act
discourage discriminatory employment practices. Glamann v. St.

by statute or uniform course of
an exception for discrimination in
(WFEA), which was enacted to
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 424

N.W.2d 924, 927 (Wis. 1988).
304. Indus. & Mech. Contrs. of Memphis, Inc. v. Tim Mote Plumbing, LLC, 962 So. 2d 632,
638 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
305. Brown v. Mercantile Bank of Poplar Bluff, 820 S.W.2d 327, 340 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
North Dakota holds a similar rule, finding attorney fees are awardable where "the wrongful act has
forced the aggrieved person into litigation with a third party (as a result of the defendant's wrongful

act)." Olson v. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820, 828-29 (N.D. 1988).
306. Monzingo v. Alaska Air Grp., Inc., 112 P.3d 655, 665 (Alaska 2005) (quoting ALASKA R.
CIV. P. 82(b)(3)(I)). In Mon:ingo, the court made clear the award is "not intended to penalize a party
for litigating a good-faith claim," but rather to compensate a prevailing party for winning a case. Id

307. KY. REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 403.220

(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
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the interest of justice."os In Colorado, attorney's fees may be recovered in
an action for breach of a fiduciary duty.3 0 9 Utah courts have "inherent
equitable power to award reasonable attorneys' fees when doing so would
be appropriate in the interest of justice and equity.""'o Consequently,
much like in Colorado, Utah courts have come to recognize breach of a
fiduciary duty as an established exception to the rule against awarding
attorney's fees.3 11
New Jersey maintains an attorney is responsible, as part of
consequential damages, for legal expenses and attorney's fees that a client
incurs "in prosecuting the legal malpractice action." 3 12 In Iowa, awarding
attorney's fees is discretionary and depends upon the party's ability to
In Indiana, the court held that attorneys who commit malpractice
pay.
may be liable for increased appellate attorney fees if they were a "natural,
probable, and foreseeable consequence of [their] negligence." 3 1 4 The
Supreme Court of Louisiana held a plaintiff is entitled to recovery so as to
compensate him for the additional cost of attorney's fees associated with
the underlying action that the defendant attorney negligently handled.3
Ultimately, few states expressly permit an award of attorney's fees for a
legal malpractice action. But, more states have left the door open for an
award of attorney's fees when prosecuting a legal malpractice action by
308. New Hampshire courts create exceptions to the American rule when "justice ...

may

require." See Shelton v. Tamposi, 62 A.3d 741, 751 (N.H. 2013) (citation omitted) (allowing court to
award attorney's fees in a case involving the administration of a trust); Bd. of Water Comm'rs v.
Mooney, 660 A.2d 1121, 1127 (N.H. 1995) (allowing a Superior Court to award attorney's fees when
the party has "conferred a 'substantial benefit' upon the community at large").

309. See Smith v. Mehaffy, 30 P.3d 727, 732-33 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (stating when a party
brings a suit against a fiduciary for breach of trust, an exception exists to allow for the awarding of
attorney's fees). In Connecticut, the state supreme court turned to a ruling by the Supreme Court of
Colorado, which held attorney's fees may be awarded under the fiduciary duty exception.

See Mangiante v. Niemiec, 910 A.2d 235, 240-41 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (deciding a minor beneficiary
in a trust action cannot be made whole without awarding attorney's fees (citing Buder v. Sartore, 774

P.2d 1383, 1391 (Colo. 1989))).
310. Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis Cnty. Comm'n, 2005 UT App 347,

¶ 6,121

P.3d 39, 41, abrogated y Culbertson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 2008 UT App 22, 177 P.3d 621.
311. Kealamakia, Inc. v. Kealamakia, 2009 UT App 148, 117, 213 P.3d 13, 15. Montana has a

similar exception called the Foy exception, where a district court may award attorney's fees to make
an injured party whole under its equity powers. Erker v. Kester, 1999 MT 231,11 44, 296 Mont. 123,

988 P.2d 1221, 1228.
312. Saffer v. Willoughby, 670 A.2d 527, 534 (N.J. 1996).
313. Cf In re Marriage of Kimbro, 826 N.W.2d 696, 704 (Iowa 2013) (determining each party
had the ability to pay its respective attorney's fees in a divorce proceeding).

314. Hedrick v. Tabbert, 722 N.E.2d 1269, 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
315. Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 393 So. 2d 851, 859 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (citing
Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 239 (La. 1972) (recognizing attorney's fees as
damages that can be recovered in legal malpractice cases)), affd, 422 So. 2d 1109 (La. 1982).
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giving courts equitable powers to award fees.
VI. LEGAL MALPRACTICE SUITS SHOULD BE AN ADDITIONAL
EXCEPTION TO THE AMERICAN RULE IN ALLJURISDICTIONS

The difference between legal malpractice cases and other causes of
actions is explained in Rice v. Perl."' Rice hired Perl to represent her in a
personal injury action against a drug manufacturer. Perl settled the case
with the insurance adjuster, who worked part-time for Perl's law firm and
had been a good friend of Perl's for several years. After negotiating a
settlement with the insurance adjuster, Rice sued Perl after she discovered
he failed to disclose the nature of his relationship with the claims
adjuster.
Rice sued Perl alleging he breached his fiduciary obligation of
full disclosure by not informing her of Perl's business relationship with the
adjuster. However, Rice was not dissatisfied with the settlement amount
Perl had obtained for her.3

18

Customarily, the application of legal rules would favor the defendant
attorney because the attorney's wrong did not cause an injury to any of the
plaintiffs interests.3 1 The plaintiff did not suffer damages in tort or
contract and was not worse off financially than if full disclosure had been
made. 32 0 Further, the plaintiff did not rely on the defendant attorney's
nondisclosure to her detriment, nor was the attorney unjustly enriched by
the failure to disclose.3 2 1 On balance, however, in light of the policy
considerations requiring strict fidelity between an attorney and his client,
the court determined the interests were weighted in favor of the
plaintiff. 2 In the end, the attorney was required to forfeit his right to
compensation and refund all legal fees to the client.3 2 3

Courts have also recognized the special nature of the attorney-client
relationship in contexts outside legal malpractice actions.3 2 4 In fact, most
jurisdictions do not allow attorneys to limit their malpractice liability for

316. Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1982) (affirming summary judgment against attorney
for breach of fiduciary duty and forfeiture of attorney's fees).
317. Id. at 410.
318. Id.
319. Anderson & Steele, Jr., supra note 65, at 239.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Rice, 320 N.W.2d at 411 (quoting In re Estate of Lee, 214 Minn. 448, 460, 9 N.W.2d 245,
251 (1943)).
323. Id.
324. Moore, supra note 9, at 1165.
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this reason.3 2 5 In California, for example, an attorney cannot "contract
with a client prospectively limiting the [attorney's] liability to the client
for ... professional malpractice." 3 2 6
Allowing for the recovery of attorney's fees by plaintiffs in legal
malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty cases would align with the policies
behind many of the current exceptions. As demonstrated in many of the
contract clause cases, clients stand at a great disadvantage when facing
their attorneys because of the unequal bargaining power and access to
information inuring to the lawyer's benefit. Like the civil rights statutes,
society benefits from allowing injured clients to sue their lawyers.
Attorney's fees should be awarded in all breach of fiduciary duty and
attorney negligence cases. Lawyers need to make their clients whole if
they are injured due to the lawyer's conduct. Whether the attorney
intentionally or negligently committed malpractice or breach of fiduciary
duty should not be the deciding factor. "Did the attorney intentionally
accept the case from the new client knowing that there was a conflict, but
wanting the extra fees, he accepted the case anyway . .. or was he just
negligent in failing to perform a competent conflicts check?" Indeed, it
might be quite difficult to prove the state of mind of the attorney.
Instead, the analysis should focus on the special nature of the attorneyclient relationship and, in particular, on the imbalance of power and lack
of opportunity for the client to access all the information that the lawyer
possesses. As an example, assume a defendant has been sued for
nonpayment of a bill. The defendant has an excellent-indeed a perfectdefense: the goods were non-conforming. Unfortunately, the lawyer hired
by the defendant failed to answer the complaint in a timely manner and a
default judgment is entered against the defendant for $75,000. The lawyer
attempts to set aside the default but does not prevail and the defendant
now has to pay the judgment. Our former defendant now becomes a
plaintiff in a legal malpractice action against his former lawyer. As
explained above, prevailing on a legal malpractice claim is not easy and the

325. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(h)(2) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) (reiterating
the same principle set forth in California's Rules of Professional Conduct).
326. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3-400 (2004). The California Rules of Professional
Conduct provide
[an attorney shall not] .... settle a claim or potential claim for the member's liability to the
client for the member's professional malpractice, unless the client is informed in writing that the
client may seek the advice of an independent lawyer of the client's choice regarding the
settlement and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice.
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client will have to pay a new lawyer at least one-third of any recovery.
With this hypothetical, he may be able to find a lawyer to take his case, but
what if the amount of damages were smaller or the case was not such a
clear winner?
Clients have the right to expect their lawyer will protect their interests.
Lawyers are the conduits through which people access the justice system.
It is necessary that lawyers assume the burden to make their plients whole
when they are the cause of the harm to their clients-whether the damage
was caused intentionally or not.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Clients need lawyers to make the commitment to act as the true
fiduciaries they are. Be it through amending the ethics rules to require
lawyers pay the attorney's fees of their clients in the case of legal
malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty, or through judges ordering the
payment of attorney's fees within their discretion, this is the necessary
result for our clients and the legal profession.

